Month: August 2021

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Economic Performance and Democratic Consolidation Failure in Myanmar: a Case Study for Comparative Democratisation

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Maksim Vassin

Jean Balme

Global Political Economy and International Governance Analysts

Economic Performance and Democratic Consolidation Failure in Myanmar: a Case Study for Comparative Democratisation

Myanmar was plagued by civil war and internal turmoil since its independence in 1948. The recent rise of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi gave hope to the Burmese people and the international community that Myanmar started its transition from a military dictatorship to full democracy.

However, the international community’s hopes never came to fruition – Myanmar never became anything more than a hybrid regime, certainly not a free society many have expected. The article will open up with the discussion of the military leverage in Myanmar after NLD’s rise to power, as well as Myanmar’s failures to consolidate democratic power and move from being a hybrid regime to a full democracy. The discussion on the role of military conglomerates and the threat that privatisation posed to them will follow.

To understand why Myanmar’s democratic ambitions never realised, it is important to analyse the relationships between key stakeholders in Myanmar society. The most powerful stakeholder has always been the military. Even after 50 years of military dictatorship, Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, has controlled the transition process in the late-1990s and early-2000s (Nilsen, 2013). Controlling the transition process meant that the military was able to leave considerable leverage for itself, even if the nominal power was transferred to a civilian government. Traces of such leverage are seen in the 2008 Myanmar constitution. Article 109b of the Constitution reserves 110 seats in Pyuithu Hluttaw, the lower chamber of the Parliament, to appointed members of the military; Article 141b of the Constitution reserves 56 seats in Amyotha Hluttaw, the upper chamber, to appointed members of the military (2008 Constitution). This gives the military a quarter of unelected members of the parliament that have the same mandate as those who were elected by the people.

The military may have considerably scaled down but it continues to yield enormous power. The 2008 constitution gives the military a dominant role, and the armed forces are keen to use it for their advantage and influences policies within Myanmar. The constitution gives the military broad powers to act in situations that they consider to be a major constitutional crisis, as well as compromises the system of checks and balances, as the President has the authority to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Singh, 2013). Article 299b sections i-ii state that, while the President must submit the nomination to Pyuithu Hluttaw, the lower chamber has no right to reject the nomination unless it does not meet age limits or lacks sufficient experience in law (2008 Constitution).

Myanmar insofar has failed to complete crucial steps of the democratisation process outlined in Rustow’s “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”. First of all, the Background Condition was rather weak. Rustow describes national unity as the single most important background condition for launching the genesis of democracy (Rustow, 1970). However, Myanmar is a country of several ethnic groups with several secessionists and local nationalist movement entangling the country in decades-long processes. Such unconscious nationalism, which Rustow claims to be essential, is therefore virtually impossible. The second, the Preparatory Phase, had its difficulties, as well. As Rustow says, “a country is likely to attain democracy not by copying constitutional laws (…) but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation” (Rustow, 1970, p. 354). During this phase in Myanmar, several local crises have re-erupted, particularly the Kachin conflict and the Rohingya crisis. The crucial failure of Myanmar’s democratisation, however, occurred during the Habituation Phase. Rustow argues that democracy is a competition, and in such competition, those who can rationalise their commitment to democracy, or especially those who wholeheartedly believe in democracy would win (Rustow,1970). By leaving non-democratic leverage inside Myanmar’s politics for themselves, the military showed that they have no regard for democracy and are not planning to genuinely assimilate with it. This absence of commitment did not serve them well in Myanmar’s democratic elections, in which the military has consistently scored abysmal results. This meant that the military was on the verge of having their power diminished, even though the constitution provided the last resort for the military’s foothold within the country.

Such leverage of the military, as well as failures during key steps of the democratisation process, meant that Myanmar’s transition to a full democracy was jeopardised from its inception and would never be completed. The uprising of the military and the military coup that happened in 2021 was simply a question of time.

One must notice that one of the domino effects after modernisation is the role of the military drastically side-lined in the governance of the state. It is clear that the democratic transition engaged by the National League for Democracy (NLD) was not to the liking of the military clan, especially after the 2020 November general elections. Aung San Suu Ki’s party tried to compensate decades of military authoritarianism by opening up its economy to privatisation and foreign investments. It also re-adjusted the government’s budget by reducing public rents to the defence sector. Despite no official documents stating the part of the GDP’s allocations to the defence sector, cross-checking several sources have shown that the percentage evolved from 40% of the annual budget in 1988, at the beginning of the military rule, to 26.2% in 2018 (World Bank, 2020). The reduction of rents allocated to the military has undeniably modified their incentive in sharing power with more democratic institutions. The NLD has taken serious actions that thwarted the military. For the first time, in 2020, the parliament refused an additional budget request from the military of up to 7 million US dollars. This was taken as a confrontation by the military power which undoubtedly left them with a bitter taste. Thus, in a democratic transition, bodies need to distribute power proportionally to ensure stability and install an effective rule of law that would protect the emerging democracy and its citizens (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020).

The hybrid regime that has characterised Myanmar for the past ten years has slowly split the trust deal signed by the pro-democratic movement and the military power.

As Bell et al. suggest in their much-acclaimed 2018 report ‘’Military Power-Sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes’’, ‘military power-sharing also often means that militaries are expanded at a point where they should be downsized, and their central control can become more diffuse as the price of a formal state monopoly on the use of force, creating risks if the peace process breaks down’ (Bell et al., 2018).

Without a doubt, the economic interests of the Tatmadaw have paid the price of the democratic transition. Even though democracy reallocates de jure power to poorer agents, richer segments of society, in other words, the military that ruled Myanmar for decades, can take other actions to offset this by increasing their de facto power (Acemoglu et al., 2015). To do so, the rich elite has the advantage of already being empowered by the distribution of income in the democratic transition, contrary to the majority of the population. Therefore, the elite can capture the political system by pursuing investments, increasing their de facto power (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Indeed, the military, or namely the Tatmadaw have been and are key players in the Burmese economy. It governs large business interests in textiles, medical supplies, beer breweries, telecommunications or hotels.

The two main military conglomerates that rule over Myanmar’s economy are the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and the Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), both held mainly by Senior general Min Aung Hlaing and his family. This private military-owned duopoly detains the most profitable parts of the economy. ‘They benefited greatly from privatisation efforts in the 1990s and 2000s by picking up entities at fire sale prices’ (Meyer, 2021). It is under which that Min Aung Hlaing installed its leadership by erecting these two firms with the theft of public assets and corruption. These businesses have expanded their expertise by controlling a large panel of construction projects, claiming contracts and dealing directly with foreign investments, making it a cornerstone of Myanmar’s economy. The following figure proves that the two conglomerates operate directly with foreign companies in joint ventures on all sorts of businesses to control the local market without taking the risk of seeing competition infiltrating Myanmar’s market.

One of the examples that strikes the most is the beer business. In 2015, the MEHL tried to acquire the 55% of shares missing for total control of Myanmar Brewery Limited, responsible at the time of 2/3 of the national beer market. Eventually, the MEHL could only conserve their 45% in a joint venture with the Japanese group Kirin Company. This familial empire absorbed shares and the power that goes with it. In that case, the search for expansion comes at a pivotal time for the economic health of MEHL. Many multinationals such as Heineken International and Carlsberg Group have been able to enter the Burmese market in recent years due to the pro-democracy government’s free trade and competition policy. The Tatmadaw felt that its monopoly was being threatened by economic openness, capitalisation and competition, a direct consequence of the democratic transition launched by the NLD. In fact, it was not in their interest to accept fair rivalries from foreign or local businesses.

The economic openness of Myanmar can be illustrated by the import-export rate below, showing rapid and exponential growth of external trades.

Combining the failures of Myanmar’s democratic consolidation during Rustow’s key steps of the democratisation process with some personal business interests that have been threatened by the NLD’s wish to economically open Myanmar, it is certain that it pushed the Tatmadaw to act and try to re-establish an authoritarian regime.

Acemoglu, D. Johnson, S. Robinson, J. A. Yared, P. ‘Income and Democracy’. American Economic Review. Vol. 98, no. 3, pp. 808-842. 2008.

Acemoglu, D. Naidu, S. Restrepo, P. Robinson, J. A. ‘Chapter 21 : Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality’ in Handbook of Income Distribution. Volume 2B. North Holland. 2015.

Bell, C. Gluckstein, S. Forster, R. Pospisil, J. ‘PA-X Report : Power-Sharing Series. Military Power-Sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes’. Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh. 2018.

Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

Hartzell, C.A. Hoddie, M. ‘4 – Art of the Possible: Power Sharing, Democratic Transition, and Democratization in Post-Civil War States’ in Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States : The Art of Possible. pp. 74-92. Cambridge University Press. 2020.

Meyer, C. ‘Coup puts Myanmar’s crippling military capitalism in the spotlight’. Arab News. April 14, 2021. Available at https://arab.news/z2w9s

Nilsen, M. 2013. “Will democracy bring peace to Myanmar?” International Area Studies Review 16 (2): 115-141.

Rustow, D. 1970 ” Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics 2 (3): 337-363.

Singh, Udai Bhanu. 2013. “Do the Changes in Myanmar Signify a Real Transition?” Strategic Analysis 37 (1): 101-104.

Stokke K., Soe Myint Aung. 2020. “Transition to Democracy or Hybrid Regime? The Dynamics and Outcomes of Democratization in Myanmar.” The European Journal of Development Research 32: 274–293.

World Bank ‘The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment Report 2020. PEFA Secretariat, World Bank Group. March 6, 2020.

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The constraints of future peacekeeping missions in Haiti: understanding the legacy of sexual abuse and unaccountability

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Esther Brito Ruiz

Researcher in the Defence and International Security Department

The constraints of future peacekeeping missions in Haiti: understanding the legacy of sexual abuse and unaccountability 

On July 7th 2021, the world watched as news of a group of armed men storming the quarters of the Haitian president ended in the assassination of the head of state. The assassination of Jovenel Moïse has caused a political stir in the country and will lead to a new round of elections. In the meantime, Haiti’s interim government has made a controversial call for the United Nations and the United States to send armed military to secure key infrastructure points and ensure safe elections.

This request calls back to a turbulent history of foreign intervention in the country and has increased public distrust in the interim government. However, there is very well a possibility that negative developments regarding the security of the Haitian state will read the United Nations to deploy a mission in support at the transition process, as was done in the past. This is especially probable in the face of the United States declaration that it has no prospect of sending military. This potential deployment raises severe concerns on the future of Haiti and its developing security situation. Were this to be the case, it will be necessary for the UN to address the shortcomings of their previous engagements in the state, and ensure operational measures are taken to differentiate this potential new military deployment. Within this narrative, we must never forego the notion that it is the Haitian people that must be the agents determine the future of their country, and UN forces must solely – if deployed – serve to help support and secure those popular demands, without incurring in the harm these missions have historically caused to the community. With this aim, its necessary to understand the history of the United Nations mission in Haiti as a precondition for building a more responsive, accountable, and effective operation.

The UN Mission in Haiti: the legacy of sexual abuse and cholera

Throughout the last two decades, Haiti has experienced a variety of trying situations – ranging from civil and political unrest, coups, the assassination of political leaders, the proliferation of organized-crime, and severe natural disasters.  Some of these circumstances were what prompted UN Resolution 1542, through which the United Nations Security Council approved the deployment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) took place from 2004 to 2017 and had its fair share of both successes and failures. Having mobilized almost 8500 military and police personnel, as well as over 1500 civilian staff, the mission represented the largest UN engagement in the country’s history (Kolbe, 2020). The mission’s original mandate was to protect civilians against organized crime and cycles of violence (Lemay-Hébert, 2015), but was expanded in 2010, after the earthquake worsened the condition of existing governance structures. As a result, the mission was tasked with providing humanitarian support, helping manage elections, and ensuring the protection of human rights. However, its presence became  despised by the local population – with peacekeepers holding as little legitimacy with local populations as local institutions (Mary Fran & Roslyn, 2013).  This perception was due to both the critical negligence of the PKO that caused a cholera epidemic, which killed thousands of Haitians, and the horrific instances of sexual assault by peacekeepers.

The MINUSTAH mission is known for their precipitation of a deadly cholera outbreak in 2010. After the devastating earthquake Haiti suffered, negligent sanitation practices within a UN peacekeeping base brought forth one of the most severe cholera epidemics in the state’s recent history. Over 800.000 Haitians needed medical attention, and almost 10,000 lost their lives (Ivers & Guillaume, 2017). This paradoxical failure called into question the peacekeeping mission’s presence in Haiti and whether they were fulfilling their mandate or worsening the situation further (Agbedahin, 2019). 

Adding to his is the mission’s troubling legacy of unaccountability in regards to sexual abuse. While this was not the only UN operation in which accusations of severe sexual violence against members of local communities occurred (Lee & Bartels, 2020) – allegations have been registered across missions in Haiti, CAR, Libera, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the rape of civilians by UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti became a notorious feature of the mission. A long line of feminist scholarship has explored the gendered dynamics of sexual violence in PKOs – noting that adverse local socio-economic conditions facilitate the coercive scenarios in which sexual abuse in PKOs occurs (Vahedi, Bartels, & Lee, 2021; Vahedi, et al. 2021). While the UN has instituted a Zero Tolerance Policy, the MINUSTAH mission saw 119 registered allegations of sexual abuse from 2007 to March of 2021 – with the real number is estimated to be much higher (Kolbe, 2020). Additionally, beyond the direct cases of sexual abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers, it is considered that MINUSTAH created what is called a “Peacekeeping Economy” in Haiti –economic activity derived directly from the presence of peacekeepers and international aid workers – which led to an expansion of the local sex industry and an increase in human trafficking (Toledo & Braga, 2020).   

Allegations of sexual abuse have often been denied investigation, even when extensive evidence has been provided, proving them true (Ivers & Guillaume, 2017).  This denies justice for victims and naturally worsens – if not nullifies – the role of PKOs as protectors. There is little recourse for victims due to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which decreets that troop-contributing countries maintain legal jurisdiction over the troops sent to PKOs (Reiz & O’Lear, 2016). This creates legal lagoons where victims in states harboring PKOs are unable to seek redress. While there is a base for this arrangement with regards to international security – fewer countries would be as willing to engage in missions if they were required to renounce legal control over their troops – this has severe human rights implications. One example of this is the conditions suffered by children fathered by MINUSTAH peacekeepers – which studies have shown experience high levels of economic deprivation and have been denied access to basic services and education (Lee & Bartels, 2020).  Overall, there has been no accountability for perpetrators or compensation for victims – painting the mission as almost an occupying force, rather than a provider of aid and security.

Policy changes needed for any future United Nations Missions in Haiti

The following measures would serve as a starting point to restructure future UN operations in Haiti: 

Firstly, the legal framework established by the UN SOFA needs to be reconsidered in this case so as to increase the accountability of sexual violence by peacekeepers – weather by structural amendments to UN procedures or by agreements with troop contributing countries. This is a precondition for any realistic re-entry of UN troops into the state, and would help promote public trust. In addition, compensation funds or other redress measures would need to be facilitated to victims – both with regards to sexual abuse claims and the cholera epidemic. While a compensatory fund was established for the later, financing has been scarce and the recognition of responsibility by UN officials has been lacking. 

Secondly, the inclusion of binding international human rights law principles in the deployed mission can also help both enhance operational effectiveness and promote greater accountability (Howland, 2006). This can be argued of legal precedence due to the binding commitments of both the UN and the troop contributing states based on treaty commitments. As such, any approved and funded UN operations would be subject to these incurred obligations. While there is increased consensus on this matter, there is no practical operationalization of these obligations on the ground. A prospective mission into Haiti could serve as a testing ground for these new obligations, which would not only serve to enhance transparency and accountability, but also increase local reporting of abuses. Of course, this will be dependent on a strong and consistent enforcement mechanism. 

Thirdly, some UN missions and policymakers have suggested that more gendered balanced missions – with a higher presence of female peacekeepers – might serve to reduce instances of sexual violence or increase reporting by victims (Karim and Beardsley, 2016). This view can be problematic insofar it may be based on the belief that increasing the number of women in PKOs will serve to automatically reduce sexual violence (Simić, 2010). This of course, not in any way the case (Mazurana, et al., 2002). There have been studies have implied that – only if and when adequately trained, engaged, and visible – women peacekeepers can contribute to operational success by aiding in more gender-aware policies and contributing to changes in mission’s behavior (Karim & Beardsley, 2016). However, the impact of gender-mixed units in peacekeeping are not generalizable and remain context specific, contingent upon certain commonalities in identity – be they linguistic, cultural, ethnic or other – between the host community and the peacekeepers (Heinecken, 2015). In this same line, this impact depends on interaction with local communities– if this engagement is to make local women and girls to be more inclined to report abuses to female peacekeepers (Valenius, 2007). However, long term reductions will have to address the root causes of sexual misconduct and necessitate severe and consistent punishment for perpetrators (Simić, 2010). A future UN mission in Haiti would benefit from PKO’s troops that speak a common language with the local population or share other identity features that can help them better interact and promote trust with local communities. 

Ultimately, these policies can serve as a starting point from which a potential UN deployed mission can start to build back trust in Haiti, after their lackluster heritage. If the security situation in Haiti were to worsen, and UN engagement became a reality, future missions must be ready to adhere to these and added policies so as to fulfill their fundamental obligations: those of their mandate and those of the founding principles of the UN.

Agbedahin, K. (2019). The haiti cholera outbreak and peacekeeping paradoxes. Peace Review, 31(2), 190-198.

During the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), reports of sexual abuse and exploitation and children fathered by peacekeepers were brought forward to the UN

Heinecken, L. (2015). Are Women ‘Really’Making a Unique Contribution to Peacekeeping?: The Rhetoric and the Reality. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 19(3-4), 227-248.

Howland, T. (2006). Peacekeeping and conformity with human rights law: how MINUSTAH falls short in Haiti. International Peacekeeping, 13(4), 462-476.

Ivers, L. C., & Guillaume, Y. (2017). The Price of Peace? Peacekeeping with Impunity Harms Public Health in Haiti. The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene, 97(3), 639.

Karim, S., & Beardsley, K. (2016). Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries. Journal of Peace Research, 53(1), 100-115.

Kolbe, A. R. (2020). Prospects for Post-Minustah Security in Haiti. International Peacekeeping, 27(1), 44-57.

Lee, S., & Bartels, S. (2020). ‘They put a few coins in your hand to drop a baby in you’: a study of peacekeeper-fathered children in Haiti. International Peacekeeping, 27(2), 177-209.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2015). United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Mary Fran T, M., & Roslyn K, C. (2013). Peacekeepers and the people: Domestic evaluations of peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 17(3-4), 385-413.

Mazurana, D., Lopez, E. P., Johnston, N., & Cobley, B. (2002). Gender mainstreaming in peace support operations: Moving beyond rhetoric to practice. International Alert. 

Reiz, N., & O’Lear, S. (2016). Spaces of violence and (in) justice in Haiti: a critical legal geography perspective on rape, UN peacekeeping, and the United Nations status of forces agreement. Territory, Politics, Governance, 4(4), 453-471.

Simić, O. (2010). Does the presence of women really matter? Towards combating male sexual violence in peacekeeping operations. International Peacekeeping, 17(2), 188-199.

Toledo, A., & Braga, L. M. (2020). Abuse and Sexual Exploitation in Peace Operations: The Case of MINUSTAH. Revista Estudos Feministas, 28.

Vahedi, L., Bartels, S. A., & Lee, S. (2021). ‘Even peacekeepers expect something in return’: A qualitative analysis of sexual interactions between UN peacekeepers and female Haitians. Global public health, 16(5), 692-705.

Vahedi, L., Stuart, H., Etienne, S., Lee, S., & Bartels, S. A. (2021). Gender-Stratified Analysis of Haitian Perceptions Related to Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Perpetrated by UN Peacekeepers during MINUSTAH. Sexes, 2(2), 216-243.

Valenius, J. (2007). A few kind women: Gender essentialism and Nordic peacekeeping operations. International Peacekeeping, 14(4), 510-523.

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The current pandemic will not be a “once in a century” crisis – why climate change will bring more pandemics

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Alice Altmayer

Environmental and Climatic Affairs Analyst

The current pandemic will not be a “once in a century” crisis. 

And why this will be caused by climate change. Covid-19 has undeniably changed our lives. From our social habits to the way we work, our  ambition to achieve ever greater comfort has been challenged, especially in the northern  hemisphere and the cities.

This abrupt change quickly leads us to underline the exceptional  character of such a crisis and qualify it as a “once in a century” crisis. While this statement was  still plausible at the time of the last disruptive pandemic in 1918, it is less believable today, as  human activities increase the frequency of outbreaks. As Professor Matthew Baylis from the  University of Liverpool states, “As in the last 20 years, we’ve had six significant threats – SARS,  MERS, Ebola, avian influenza and swine flu. We dodged five bullets but the sixth got us”. One of the main drivers of this phenomenon is the ever-growing impact of humans on  biodiversity. The human-induced biodiversity loss and destruction of natural habits are  gradually favouring zoonotic diseases and spill-over effects, i.e. diseases transmitted from  animals to humans. Let’s take the example of city building. When a city is created, as natural  as it now seems to us, it means destroying a complex biodiversity that was previously there. 

By destroying the natural habitat, humans are creating more and more interfaces with species,  thus promoting the exchange of pathogens. But the threat does not end there. According to new research, the most resistant species to human action, such as rats and pigeons, are also  the ones most likely to transmit diseases to them. Their populations even tend to increase  when an environment changes from rural to urban, as they replace the more rare and specific  biodiversity that did not survive the change. These findings, made after analysis of more than  184 studies on a total of more than 7,000 species (BBC), underline the potential danger  associated with urbanisation. 

This statement is doubly challenging as an urban environment also means increased human proximity, thus facilitating human-to-human transmission, and the onset of an epidemic and  a potential pandemic.

For instance, Ebola outbreaks in Central Africa did not create an  epidemic until Guinean citizens sought medical treatment in major cities in 2014. Once in the  city, the virus was able to flourish (Genton et al, 2014). This is all the more worrying when one  considers the large share of substandard housing in the growth of cities in developing  countries. Currently, more than one billion people are living in informal settlements, often  near cities (UN). Those settlements do not have the sanitary facilities necessary for the good  health of their population. The populations of such settlement are thus more in contact with  animals carrying contagious diseases but are also more exposed to waterborne diseases. Without any urgent change in policies, urbanisation will continue to favour outbreaks. 

The impact of humans is not only in their distribution. Indeed, man-made climate change is  also a crucial factor in the increase of outbreaks. As we warm the planet, we disrupt entire  ecosystems, forcing them to change and adapt. For instance, the new temperatures will allow more areas to be inhabited by mosquitoes transmitting diseases such as malaria or dengue  fever. It is important to note that this disease can also be transmitted between humans. Thus,  according to the World Health Organization (WHO), between 2030 and 2050, 250,000 more  people will die from mosquito-borne diseases. For instance, dengue fever has already gained  ground in recent years. In 1970, it was endemic in 9 countries, today that number has risen to  128, and projections state that it will threaten 60% of the population in 2080.

The movement of animals is therefore a pressing issue if we are to cope with this new “pandemic era” (Dr Anthony Fauci). Let’s take the example we are familiar with due to the  current contact: Bats. Bats are carriers of many viruses and other pathogens. Between 1994  and 1998 at least four pathogens were transmitted to humans by bats. Not every disease  becomes a pandemic, but if the frequency of these exchanges continues to increase, the risk  of a pandemic also does.

With global warming, disruption of their environment, and natural food source cycles, bats  struggle to find food. Hence, they move closer to civilisation (Robert M Beyer, 2021). This  trend favours their contact with other animals and humans as well as increases their risk of  transmitting pathogens. To take a concrete example, in 1994, in Australia, bats moved closer  to civilisation for reasons already mentioned. By urinating in grass later ingested by horses,  these bats contaminated them with a virus that caused the death of 7 people (RollingStone). With an estimate of 1.7 million undiscovered viruses in the animal population, the movement  of animals and their increased contact with humans are cause for concern in the coming years. 

Our way of exploiting nature and organising ourselves as a society is therefore not optimal in  protecting us from epidemics, but rather increases the risk of their creation. This is a global  phenomenon that cannot be confined to specific countries. Therefore, we need to rely on  international cooperation as a foundation on which to build our resilience. At a time of  uncertainty when it is easy to turn inward, many call for greater collaboration. On 30 March  2021, world leaders joined a call led by the WHO and the European Council for an international  treaty on preventing and managing future pandemics. This treaty will aim to increase  collaboration in pandemic research and response to limit their frequency and impact. At the same time, the “One Health” approach advocated by the WHO joins and extends this  idea of international collaboration. “One Health” considers health and disease in a holistic,  interconnected way between the environment, animals and humans. Better prevention, therefore, requires a global analysis of these different sectors It advocates extensive  collaboration between sectors, for example, between industries and academics in exchanging  research and data to expand knowledge and prevention of pandemics. 

These new ways of thinking about our connection to each other and to the environment must  form the basis of our response to future pandemics if we are to limit their impact.

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Football: more than just a game?

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Emma Somos

Health and Social Affairs Analyst

Football – more than just a game?

As the long-awaited final match of UEFA European Football Championship (Euros) takes place, thousands of eager fans will be crowded into pubs and bars across the World. The game’s sheer ability to draw-in people, including those who may not usually be football fans, into this multi-billion pound industry leaves economic and political powers at awe.

No wonder the game which was once a simple recreation has now evolved into one of the world’s largest institutions; with the symbolic (or “soft”) power to communicate and promote both cultural and political messages, all while generating huge revenue. So as we all sit and watch the final between England and Italy, somewhere in the back of our minds we must wonder…is football more than just a game?

European football attracts global attention, and despite a nominal political neutrality being strongly promoted by The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), one cannot ignore the political connections of individual teams. Clubs such as Paris Sain-Germain (owned by Qatar) and Manchester City (owned by the United Arab Emirates) present strong connections between national government interests and the game of football.¹ Countries that get to host important football games and tournaments also gain a global exposure which not only brings economic advantages such as increased tourism and investment opportunities, but also an increased exposure of their political leadership and values.

First introduced by Harvard Political Scientist Joseph Nye, the concept of “soft power” described the way countries can achieve their goals not by direct action, but by “getting other countries to want what it wants”.² On one hand, sports can help popularise countries, and their respective governments can capitalise on such attraction by fostering political cooperation and asserting themselves as global leaders. Researchers view China and Qatar’s increasing engagement with global sports to be based on such a desire to acquire ‘soft power’.³ On the other hand, athletes (and increasingly fans) have also begun to realise how sports, especially football, can function as a platform to communicate and as a means to achieve social action. Society and sports are deeply embedded systems and the long history of athlete activism demonstrates this.⁴ Although most would agree that athlete activism is entirely different to governments and corporations asserting their interests and power through sports, some remain unconvinced. While athletes usually speak up for social diversity and inclusion, or against human rights abuses, governments and corporations tend to have more power and profit-related intentions.

The expected political neutrality of football games are fixed in Articles 1 and 2(a) of the UEFA Statutes, stating “neutral, politically and religiously” is essential to “promote football in Europe in a spirit of peace, understanding and fair play, without any discrimination on account of politics, gender, religion, race or any other reason”.⁵ Although the UEFA, and International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), have historically been stringent in their policing of political or social statements made by teams and players, there seems to have been more ease in restrictions over the past year.

The national soccer teams of Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands all wore T-shirts that supported human rights during the 2022 World Cup qualifiers voicing a criticism of migrant workers’ rights in Qatar, the host of next year’s World Cup.^5 Furthermore, the murder of George Floyd and recent police brutality towards the African-American community in the United States inspired many football players to take the knee before matches to show support for racial justice and solidarity with people of colour. In a step away from its usually neutral position, UEFA announced its support for players taking the knee because it “has a zero-tolerance against racism and any player who wants to demand equality amongst human beings by taking the knee will be allowed to do so”.⁶ An act as simple as dropping to one knee has had the power to bring discussions of racial inequality and discrimination onto the global agenda. It has proved a powerful tool in the ongoing fight for racial justice, but also provides an example of how the soft power of football has the ability to impact positively on society, and not just increase power and revenue for some stakeholders.

In addition to racism, LGBTQIA+ discrimination has also became a central topic during the Euros 2020. Discrimination against the LGBTQIA+ Community in Hungary increased as a new law passed in the FIDESZ majority national parliament practically banned any LGBTQIA+ representation or support from education.⁷ Members of the LGBTQIA+ community in Hungary already had no legal right to marry, adopt kids, or have legal recognition of gender reassignment. This latest bill is particularly outrageous as it falsely conflates LGBTQIA+ with paedophilia. Despite this, the UEFA showed support for Viktor Orban, national conservative and openly anti-LGTIQ prime minister of Hungary, only one year before national elections in Hungary take place. Orban has been known for his obsession with football, or more precisely, with building unnecessary and enormous stadiums in Hungary (of which the construction contracts have been awarded to his close friends and allies).⁸ Although Orban’s right wing voter coalition building has proved to be effective⁹, as his party has been re-elected twice in the past 10 years, there is increasing opposition among Hungarians against his openly homophobic and discriminative policies.¹0

The UEFA’s open support for such a political leader has raised questions from players, fans, and activists in solidarity with the LGBTQIA+ community.

Prior to the Euro 2020 match between Germany and Hungary, Munich City Council requested to illuminate the Allianz Arena in rainbow colours to show support for social inclusivity and diversity¹¹. UEFA rejected their request saying they are a politically neutral organisation and that the request would contradict this stance due to the “political context” given the illumination would be “a message pointing to a decision made by the Hungarian national parliament”.¹² Interestingly, Sándor Csányi, a Hungarian banker and close friend of Viktor Orbán, serves as the vice-chair of UEFA’s executive committee and FIFA, as well as being the President of the Hungarian Football Association. One is forced to consider whether such an alliance would bear influence on UEFA’s decision. In another example, UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary body also considered whether Manuel Neuer’s (goalkeeper and captain of the Germany national team) rainbow armband should be punished for displaying a “political message”, but the investigation was later dropped.¹³ Adam Crafton from The Athletic rightly reported that the UEFA is passive on homophobia, but proactive when players show solidarity.¹⁴ Aleksander Čeferin, President of UEFA is known to have a good relationship and has been pictured with authoritative Eastern European leaders such as Alexander Lukashenko (President of Belarus), Vladimir Putin (President of Russia) and Viktor Orban (Prime Minister of Hungary).

As a young Hungarian myself, I recognise the advantages and joy of attending such high-level games in my capital, however the UEFA providing spotlight and prestige for undemocratic leaders without any challenge or scrutiny is a shame. There is an urgent need to engage and grow the game outside of Western Europe, and be more aware of the game’s subtle association with certain leaders, countries, and organisations.

This being said, we are now witnessing a change across the entire footballing industry. Some clubs and players are becoming increasingly aware of their soft power and have begun to show support for particular social justice matters. The lighting of stadiums with rainbow colours by several German clubs during recent matches shows solidarity with the LGBTQIA+ community. Posting images and messages on social media has also allowed clubs to demonstrate their support for a more inclusive and diverse society. Following the controversy prior to the Germany/Hungary match, German player Manuel Neuer addressed his position as an athlete activist: “In the past, it was often the case that we did not position ourselves politically that way and instead followed the guidelines as it always has been, but we want to give the national team a face and show people that there are important things outside of football that we point out and that we stand behind. We are role models for many children and young people, and I think that we are currently giving a positive image”.¹⁵

Sports is not something that exists in a bubble and that can be fully autonomous. Football can serve as a platform of discussion and be the leader of change. And while the space of football has long been dominated by powerful stakeholders such as football federations, governments and corporations, athletes and consumers are beginning to realise their voice in the game. The coming years will be a turning point for the industry and I, for one, am looking forward to the witnessing the growth of the game.

[1] East, S. (2015). Middle East millions fueling European football [Online]. CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/12/football/qatar-uae-sponsor-football-europe/index.html (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[2] Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, (80), 153. doi:10.2307/1148580 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580

[3] ‘Qatar’s big push to establish itself as a footballing soft power’. (2019, September 09) [Online]. Goal. Available at: https://www.goal.com/en-sg/news/qatar-football-soft-power-major-investment-world-cup-fifa/1ftx705j09k0f16omvssx82f90 (Accessed: 09 July 2021) and Leite J. E. and Rodrigues C. (2020) Belt, Road and Ball: Football as a Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Tool. In: Leandro F., Duarte P. (eds) The Belt and Road Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_4

[4] Reeves, R.. (2021). A new era of athlete activists inherit a centuries-old fight for justice [Online]. The Undefeated. Available at: https://theundefeated.com/features/a-new-era-of-athlete-activists-inherit-a-centuries-old-fight-for-justice/ (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[5] ‘Qatar World Cup: Germany, Norway and Netherlands players voice human rights concerns’. (2021, March 30) [Online]. SkySports. Available at: https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095/12258996/qatar-world-cup-germany-norway-and-netherlands-players-voice-human-rights-concerns (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[6] ‘Europe divided on taking the knee during EURO 2020 football tournament’ (2021, June 11) [Online]. Euronews. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/11/europe-divided-on-taking-the-knee-during-euro-2020-football-tournament (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[7] Papp, R. (2021). Discrimination against LGBTIQ Community in Hungary. [Online]. 4Liberty.eu. Available at: http://4liberty.eu/discriminating-against-the-lgbtiq-community-in-hungary-and-its-implications/ (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[8] Lambert, S. (2018). Orbán Government Stadium Construction. [Online]. The Orange Files. Available at: https://theorangefiles.hu/government-stadium-construction/ (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[9] Goldblatt, D. and Nolan, D. (2018). Viktor Orbán’s reckless football obsession. [Online]. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/11/viktor-orban-hungary-prime-minister-reckless-football-obsession (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[10] Simon, Z. (2021). Same-Sex Parenthood Draws Unexpected Support in Hungary. [Online]. Bloomberg. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-21/same-sex-parenthood-draws-unexpected-support-in-hungary (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[11] Gulácsi, P. (2021, February 23.). Instagram post. [Online]. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/CLon2VUlbKL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[12] Vaski, T. (2021) FM Szijjártó Praises UEFA for Declining Munich’s Rainbow Stadium ‘Provocation’. [Online]. Available at: https://hungarytoday.hu/munich-rainbow-stadium-uefa-rainbow-flag/ and Miller, G. (2021). Uefa blocks the protest at the LGBTQ + rainbow stadium in Munich | Euro 2020. [Online]. Available at: https://insider-voice.com/uefa-blocks-the-protest-at-the-lgbtq-rainbow-stadium-in-munich-euro-2020/ (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[13] ‘Manuel Neuer: UEFA drops review of rainbow armband worn by Germany captain at Euro 2020 during Pride Month’ (2021, June 21) [Online]. SkySports. Available at: https://www.skysports.com/football/news/19692/12337162/manuel-neuer-uefa-drops-review-of-rainbow-armband-worn-by-germany-captain-at-euro-2020-during-pride-month (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[14] Crafton, A. D. . (2021, June 22.). Tweet. [Online]. Available at: https://twitter.com/AdamCrafton_/status/1407230000055607297?s=20 (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

[15] Salt, N. (2021). Germany are in talks about taking the knee ahead of Euro 2020 Wembley showdown against England tomorrow despite not kneeling at all in 2021… with goalkeeper Manuel Neuer impressed by solidarity of Three Lions in tackling racism. [Online]. Mail Online. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/sportsnews/article-9732631/Euro-2020-Germany-talks-taking-knee-ahead-Wembley-showdown-against-England.html (Accessed: 09 July 2021)

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Global Political Economy and Governance

Income Inequality in Italy: Policy Analysis

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Biagio Rosso

Head of Global Political Economy and Global Governance Department

Income Inequality in Italy: Policy Analysis

Income inequality in Italy has increased since the mid-1980s, and the coun- try is comparatively among the most unequal ones in the OECD group. The most salient elements are rising top incomes, a squeezing middle class, and high disposable income inequality. Three factors concur in causing income inequality. The rise in top incomes and squeezing middle class is rooted in routine-biased technical change and substantially weakened employment protection legislation. The compositional prevalence of pensions in the Italian transfer scheme instead explains the high level of disposable income inequality despite high public social expenditure.

Two consequences. First, a decades-long low-grow path due to slowing consumer expenditure and suboptimal investment in the presence of credit market imperfections, while a positive effect of income inequality on growth through increased saving rates is not observed after the mid-1990s. Second, declining rates of political participation.Several policy options. Re-regulating employment is discouraged on the grounds of adverse efficiency effects and the institutional barrier of tripartite concertation. Instead, jointly improving flexicurity and increasing spending on primary and secondary education may help contain earnings polarisation and support the middle class in the longer term. To make these policies financially sustainable, and to jointly abate the level of disposable income inequality, it is necessary to reduce pension expenditure and increase top tax rates. Yet, there may be a fundamental trade-off between achieving a sustainable reduction in income inequality and political support.

Consult the full study here.